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Experimental Social Science Laboratory, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 310058, China
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Matching pennies game is the simplest game in game theory. In data from laboratory experi-
mental economics, with the metric for an instantaneous velocity measurement, we report the first
observation of the evolutionary velocity field in the population strategy state space of the game.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Cc 89.65.-s 01.50.My 02.50.Le
Background: In evolutionary game theory (EGT), an evolutionary dynamic equation describes the velocity field.1
A velocity field quantifies the direction and the magnitude of the populations’ strategy state change (△x) in a unit2
of time (△t) at each given state x in the populations’ strategy state space X [1–4].3
Laboratory experimental economics removes EGT from its abstract setting and links the theory to observed behav-4
ior [5]. The observed populations behavior in the experiments are systematic, replicable, and roughly consistent with5
the dynamical systems approach [6–11]. The evolutionary velocity field has never before been obtained empirically.6
In this letter, we will use a laboratory matching pennies game (MPG) to experimentally obtain the the evolutionary7
velocity field.8
Space, State and Time: In EGT analogy [4], without loss of generality, we use a two-population MPG as an9
example. In the first population X , the strategy set is {X1,X2} for each agent; similarly, in the second population10
Y , it is {Y1,Y2}. The payoff matrix is in shown Table I [17]. If there are 4 agents in each population, an observable11
instantaneous populations strategy state should be x:=(p, q) ∈ X. X is the populations strategy state space and12
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, 1}, and p (q) is the density of X1 (Y1) in X (Y ). Figure 1 is an illustration, in which13
the square 5× 5 lattice (gray dots) is the space X and xA=(
1
4
, 3
4
) is a state.14
In experimental economics, the time t is the label along the repeated rounds in a session. At each round t, there15
is one observation of xt in X. Therefore, the smallest tick △t is 1 and is the time interval between two successive16
rounds.17
Metric for Velocity: Figure 1 shows a microscopic process P from which one observation of an instantaneous18
velocity, υopq, can be defined [12]. From t to t+1, the forward change at a given state (p, q) is described as x
+=xt+1−xt.19
From t-1 to t, the backward change is x−=xt − xt−1. Hence, at a given state (p, q), we define, υ
o
pq, as20
υopq :=
(
x+ + x−
)
/(2△t). (1)
Practically, in experimental economics, △t=1. In Eq.(1), υopq satisfies two requirements for the measurement of21
instantaneous velocity (1) instantaneous: time interval is practically the smallest; (2) time odd: it is time reversal22
asymmetric [18]. Then, the mean velocity vector at the (p, q) can be computed as23
υpq =
1
Ωpq
∑
o
υopq, (2)
where Ωpq is the total observation of the state (p, q) and the summation is carried over all of the rounds whenever24
the observed state is (p, q). A practical numeric example for calculation of a υpq is shown in the S2 in electronic25
supplementary materials.26
Experiment: This experiment uses the traditional experimental setting for social evolution [6–11, 13]. We em-27
ployed the MPG among two populations with the payoff matrix in Table I. Each population includes 4 subjects. There28
TABLE I: Payoff matrix of the MPG
Y1 Y2
X1 5 0
0 5
X2 0 5
5 0
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram for an observation of an instantaneous velocity vopq. The 5×5 Lattice (in gray dots) is the population
strategy state space X of the two populations MPG. xA is one of the states in X and xA=(0.25, 0.75). Suppose that, during a
microscope process P including both a forward change (x+) and a backward chang (x−), the observed state at t is xA, and at
(t− 1) is xB and at (t+ 1) is xC , by Eq. (1), v
o
A=(xC − xB)/2 (arrow in blue) is an instantaneous velocity at xA.
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FIG. 2: Obtained evolutionary velocity field in laboratory MPG. The red star (∗) indicates the mean observation of density.
The numeric label indicates the observed occupation Ωpq of each state. The blue arrow from each state indicates the direction
and the magnitude of mean velocity υpq. The plotting ratio is 1 : 1.
are 12 independent sessions and each session includes 300 rounds repeated with random matching protocol. For more29
details, see S1 in the electronic supplementary materials.30
Results: Figure 2 shows the main results from our experimental data for the MPG. The mean observation of31
density is x∗=(0.510, 0.490). For each state, Figure 2 shows the total number of observation Ωpq and the mean32
velocity vector υpq. Globally, a significant cyclic velocity field pattern is observed.33
For state (p, q), the normal vector is defined as rpq :=xpq − x
∗. Our results show a statistically significant positive34
correlation between |υpq| and |rpq| (p=0.000); The angle from υpq to rpq is a right angle (±7%) [19].35
Summary: In our data of MPG, statistically, the larger the magnitude of the normal vector, the faster the evolution36
should be. Meanwhile, the direction of the evolution is perpendicular to the normal vector. In the full population37
strategy state space, the evolutionary velocity field pattern is cyclic and clockwise.38
The existence of the velocity pattern is not observed only in our data. Using the same experimetrics as above and39
the data from ref. [13] and ref. [9], which contains 19 different payoff matrix treatments of 2×2 games of laboratory40
experimental economics, results of the significant cyclic velocity fields are als observed. For more details see S3 in the41
electronic supplementary materials.42
The matching pennies game is the simplest model in game theory [14] and the evolution dynamical pattern can be43
modeled theoretically [2, 15]. In this letter, we report the first empirical observation of the evolutionary velocity field.44
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